History of Russian Thought Essay Example for Free

History of Russian Thought EssayRussian governmental and social thought remains a mystery to many historians, often insisting that Russia neatly conform to western atomic number 63an categories of development and thought. Rejecting this odd sort of Euro-centrism is the first task of the intellectual historian, and from this point of slang has Walicki made his c areer as the wests premier historian of Russian governmental theory. stipulation the fact that this throw is 467 pages, it is not this reviews intention to summarize the contents of this move, but quite to concern itself with method and the approach to this complex and ill-understood subject. A good place to induce might be the basic class distinctions in Russian society. It is no accident that the book begins with two highly related objects the rise of heaven thought under Catherine II (the Great) and, concomitant with this rise, the development of an elitist, aristocratic foe to the crown. This start of some s ort of Enlightenment-based criticism of monarchy derives twain from western sources, that specific solelyy of Montesquieu, as well as ancient Russian sources, that specifically of the ancient boyar duma, or elite assembly of the land.Hence, the stage is set for the remainder of the book the constant fluctuation, often confusing, between modern, western models of political critique pleasantly seasoned with large doses of ancient political institutions. It is never made clear, and it is likely impossible to make clear, which element took center stage, the west or the ancient institutions. Among the Russian Slavophiles, major critics of Peter the Great and his western reforms, it is made clear.The Slavophiles, a specifically mystic, and Christian movement, al intimately Rousseauian in its basic social theory, based their approach on the criticism of the crown on the ancient Russian institutions of the peasant commune, the boyar Duma and the ancient piety of the Russian Church. Hence, primeval on, Walicki crates a typological distinction that defines the consummate work that between the more or less western-style, liberal rejection of monarchical absolutism, and a more peasant-based and communal criticism of the centralization of royal power.Neither approach rejects monarchy per se, but they criticize the development of the Petrine verbalise, that is the centralized, expensive, militarized and bureaucratic absolutism introduced into Russia by Peter the Great as incompatible with Russian usances. In terms of this typology, the most extreme of the first group might be the Decembrist movement, especially in the radical masonic societies of capital of Minnesota Pestel.Unlike many historians, Walicki refuses to ignore the powerful part played by Masons in 18th and nineteenth century Russian biography. The Decembrists, like nearly all opposition movements in the mid 19th century, was both Masonic and aristocratic, having few roots among the common people. Ultimate ly, Pestel rejected monarchy altogether, demanding an aristocratic based popular assembly pick out by full and universal suffrage without property qualifications.He promised Poland its independence, and blush became the first Russian Zionist, attribute that Jews who refused to assimilate into the hot Russia would be sent to Palestine to create a new Jewish kingdom with government assistance. He was joined in the revolutionary effort by the Society of United Slavs, as well aristocratic and military based, who fought with Pestel over ideological concerns, chief of which was the place of sometime(a) Russian institutions in the new society.The United Slavs, slightly less radical then Pestels organization, sought to base the new representative order on the old Russian institutions of the duma and collective farming arrangements. Now, while the Decembrists ultimately failed, largely ascribable to internal divisions and their lack of understanding of Russian conditions, the real s ignificance of these movements was to give the gentry a everyday program run by semi-secret organizations, in the Decembrist case, military societies.The very fact that these groups were wealthy and aristocratic proves their limitations, and does show, as Walicki insists, that there is no distinction between class and political ideology, since political ideology was largely laid by class status, at least in the sense that Russian nobles viewed themselves as heir to old Russia instead than to Petrine Russia. But just what they meant by old Russia is another(prenominal) story, and itself is a powerful subtext to this work.The approach to Freemasonry in Russia is worth a review in itself. Rarely dealt with in a serious way, the Masons are pictured by Walicki as the last refuge of the old aristocracy both accepting and rejecting the western Enlightenment. The blow in this other excellent section is whether or not the public republicments of the Masonic organizers were truly the touch sensation of the order, or were simply exoteric utterances of the initiated speaking to a backward society.Nevertheless, Masonry (and Walicki holds that these were mostly funded by foreign sources) became a sort of pseudo-religion for the alienated old aristocrats long pushed out of power by the distant, upstart Petersburg bureaucracy. It is clear that the Masons were stringently clubs for the wealthy, sought to usher in a new golden age of history and looked down upon finance. These rather odd confluences of ideas simply tell us what little the Masons ere willing to speak nearly in public, or, even more, the fact that the aristocracy was using Masonry to challenge the organization of the Petersburg bureaucracy.Either way, masonry was a means whereby the old aristocracy could organize their forces and pool resources, but whether there was a political program that was basically agreed upon is another matter. Pestels group came the closest. It is rare that the western Enlighte nment is imported wholesale into Russia. In fact, Pestel is an exception in that regard. At first, the famed Russian polemicist Peter Chaadaev held that western Europe should be imported to Russia, since, as he became famous for saying, Russia has no history. Chaadaev made himself infamous in Russia by holding that there was no Russian history until Peter the Great made elite Russia European, slyly assuming that historical nations are European, technically advanced and based on baconian scientific models of administration. But his fascination with such things faded early on in his career, as both the revolutionary fervor of France and the dominance of the bourgeois repelled him. For Chaadaev, Old Europe was that of the medieval aristocracy rather than the modern, revolutionary bourgeois.Later figures like Alexander Herzen began their own careers with the same approach, nevertheless to actually live in England and France in exile, eventually returning to Russia with a loathing for E uropean fashions and political ideologies. But all of these distinctions can be brought under our original methodological heading the aristocratic opposition to the crown and the forms that this upper class agitation can take. The problem with this approach is that it leaves out the peasantry as a politically active part of the population.The fact that Walicki has no reference to the Old Believers and their strict, Russian Orthodox anarchism that numbered about 20 million followers by the middle of the 19th century is a major, glaring blur in the work itself. But, without saying so explicitly, this work seems to revolve around the aristocracy and the modes that their opposition to the Petrine state took over time. But the positive side to this approach is that it proves, contrary to typical courses in political theory, that radicalism in Russia was an upper class phenomenon and had few roots with the peasants, who were inclined to the Old Belief.Class status here meant that the hig her(prenominal) one found oneself in the economic or aristocratic hierarchy, the more you were inclined to oppose the state (which itself, was based on a service bureaucracy rather than the old aristocracy) and the more one was to run away to radical theories of either economics or politics. The smattering of detail this review offers seeks to suggest that the aristocratic splits in Russian society are responsible for the development of its political ideas.Even more, if a thesis of this work can be found, this is likely it. Masonry, materialism, communitarianism, and even Marxism (though much later) all stem from the various battles among aristocratic and otherwise upper class factions. What they had in common was that they were wealthy, urban and sought to bring about a semi-utopia by force and revolution, bringing the dark masses to a true knowledge of their destiny and social importance.Hence, all of these movements opposed the monarchy in one sense or another. With very few exc eptions, these movements all began rather fascinate with western ideas, only to be repelled by them once actual contact with westerners became a fact. But the enlightenment was not rejected, only dressed in Russian clothing. Only the Leninists broke this mold, importing Marxism from Germany with few modifications, without the slightest assignment to Russia as a cultural entity.The very fact that Leninism was so bizarre in Russian history shows how alien it was from currents of even the most radical thought in Russia and hence, how it was forced to impose itself by violence. What seems to associate all Russian radical ideas together is that they were not Leninists, in the sense that they all looked to Russian tradition for the germs of radical institution-building. Hence, one can conclude by holding that Russian radicalism sought to build enlightenment ideas on old Russian institutions. A project destroyed by Lenin, largely never to be revived.